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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS.
BILLS AND NOTES-RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES ON ENDORSEMENT OR TRANS-
FER-WHETHER OR NOT ENDORSEMENT OF A 'NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT BY
AN IMPOSTER PAYEE SERVES TO PASS TITLE TO A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE-
Following the modern trend of authority, the rights of a holder of a
negotiable instrument, in Illinois, have again triumphed over those of
the drawer. In the recent case of Greenberg v. A. & D. Motor Sales, Inc.,,
1341 Il1. App. 85, 93 N. E. (2d) 90 (1950).
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the Appellate Court for the First District was presented with a fact
situation which revealed that the defendant, a corporate dealer in used
automobiles, was offered an opportunity to purchase a used car from one
who was unknown to it. He represented himself to be the owner of the
automobile, one Wallace Gross, when in fact he had no interest therein.
Relying on this representation, as well as on a driver's license produced
by the imposter, defendant accepted the offer and delivered its check, pay-
able to "Wallace Gross", drawn on a local bank, to the purported vendor.
That person then endorsed the instrument, using the name of the payee,
and presented the check to the plaintiff at the latter's currency exchange.
Plaintiff discounted the instrument only after first communicating with
the defendant by telephone, receiving confirmation as to the identity of
the imposter and being assured that the instrument would be honored by
the drawee bank upon proper presentation. Prior to the time permitted
for presentation of the check to the drawee for payment, defendant dis-
covered the automobile was owned by one other than the person to whom
it had delivered its check and ordered the instrument returned as bearing
a forged endorsement. Plaintiff brought an action on the check, alleging
the issuance thereof by the defendant to one purporting to be the named
payee, followed by plaintiff's purchase thereof from such payee in good
faith, for value, and without notice of any defect in the payee's title.
The defendant, relying on Section 43 of the Illinois Negotiable Instruments
Act,2 asserted that no title passed because of the forgery. The trial court
held the defense inapplicable, particularly since the defendant did not
deny issuance of the instrument to the person who purported to be the
named payee, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The
Appellate Court, on review, affirmed the decision, applying the so-called
"imposter" rule, one well known in the law relating to commercial trans-
actions.
The principal contention of the drawer, advanced in cases of this type,
has been that the endorsement of the imposter is a forgery under which
no title can pass as against the drawer. In order that there be a forged
instrument, however, the signature or endorsement must have been made
by one other than the person intended by the drawer as the party entitled
to receive payment. It is obvious, therefore, that the intention of the
drawer becomes the true issue in each of these cases. In that regard, the
general rule adhered to by the majority of the courts is that where the
drawer delivers a check, draft, or bill of exchange to an imposter as payee,
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, § 43, declares: "Where a signature is forged
or made without authority, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the
instrument or to give a discharge thereof, or to enforce payment thereof against
any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the
party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up
the forgery or want of authority."
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supposing that he is the person he has falsely represented himself to be,
the imposter's endorsement in the name by which the payee is described is
regarded as a genuine endorsement, both as between the drawer and
drawee3 and as to subsequent holders in due course. 4
On the issue of intent, if it appears that the drawer has dealt with
the imposter, in his physical presence, and has personally delivered the
instrument to him, as in the case under discussion, it has generally been
held that it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the drawer in-
tended the person of the imposter to be the real payee.5 If, however, the
imposter was not physically before the drawer, but has induced delivery
of the instrument to himself through the employment of an intermediary
agency, such as correspondence, 6 a few of the courts have concluded that
the probable intent was to make the person named the real payee, rather
than the person of the imposter.' The additional fact that the drawer had
previously known one bearing the name used in the instrument has been
of significance in leading to the same conclusion." Furthermore, where the
3 Continental Bank v. U. S., 161 F. (2d) 935 (1947); Union Bank v. Security
Bank, 8 Cal. (2d) 303, 65 P. (2d) 355 (1937) ; Goodyear Rubber Co. v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 694, 37 P. (2d) 483 (1934); Hartford Indemnity Co. v.
Middleton Bank, 126 Conn. 179, 10 A. (2d) 604 (1939); Uriole v. Twin Falls Trust
Co., 37 Ida. 332, 215 P. 1080 (1923); U. S. Cold Storage Co. v. Manufacturer's
Bank, 343 Ii1. 503, 175 N. E. 825, 74 A. L. R. 811 (1931) ; Cooper v. Peoples Savings
Bank, 219 Ill. App. 447 (1920); Karoly v. Globe Savings Bank, 64 Ill. App. 225
(1896), but the statement is dicta; Hoge v. First National Bank, 18 Ill. App. 501
(1886) ; Metzge v. Franklin Bank, 119 Ind. 359, 21 N. E. 973 (1889); Meridian
National Bank v. First National Bank, 7 Ind. App. 322, 33 N. E. 247 (1893) ; Halsey
v. Bank of New York, 270 N. Y. 134, 200 N. E. 671 (1936) ; Seaboard National
Bank v. Bank of America, 193 N. Y. 26, 85 N. E. 829 (1908).
4 Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, 4 N. E. 619, 55 Am. Rep. 471 (1886);
Burrows v. Western Union Telephone & Telegraph Co., 86 Minn. 499, 90 N. E. 1111,
58 L. R. A. 433 (1902); Land-Title & Trust Co. v. Northwestern National Bank,
196 Pa. 230, 46 A. 420, 50 L. R. A. 75 (1900); Heavey v. Commercial National
Bank, 27 Utah 222, 75 P. 727 (1904) ; Jamison v. Heim, 43 Wash. 153, 86 P. 165
(1906).
5 Meyer v. Indiana National Bank, 27 Ind. App. 354, 61 N. E. 596 (1901) : Emporia
Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kan. 360, 11 P. 141 (1896) ; Halsey v. Bank of New York,
270 N. Y. 134, 200 N. E. 671 (1936) ; Merchant's Bank v. Metropolis Bank, 7 Daly
(N. Y.) 137 (1877); First National Bank v. American Exchange Bank, 49 App.
Div. 349, 63 N. Y. S. 58 (1905); Montgomery Garage Co. v. Liability Insurance
Co., 94 N. J. L. 152, 109 A. 296, 22 A. L. R. 1224 (1920) ; Hockett Co. v. Simmonds,
84 Ohio App. 467, 87 N. E. (2d) 739 (1949).
6 That idea is expressed in Boatsman v. Stockmen's National Bank, 56 Colo. 450,
138 P. 764 (1914), and in Metzge v. Franklin Bank, 119 Ind. 350, 21 N. E. 973
(1889), but both hold that the intermediary agency employed had no effect on the
drawer's intent to deal with the person of the imposter.
7 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bimetallic Bank, 17 Colo. App. 229, 69 P. 115
(1902) ; Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 275 N. Y. 399, 10 N. E. (2d) 457 (1937) ,
Tolman v. American National Bank, 22 R. I. 462, 48 A. 480 (1901); Simpson v.
Denver Ry. Co., 43 Utah 105, 134 P. 883 (1913).
8 Rossi v. National Bank, 71 Mo. App. 150 (1897). An illustration of this distinc-
tion, drawn from the law of sales, may be found in Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 A. C. 459
(1878).
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drawer has added a special description to the name of the payee,' or has
added a title thereto,1" the courts have been of the opinion that it was not
the imposter that was intended as the proper party to receive payment,
but the person of that description or title.
While most courts are content to construe the rights of the parties
after having determined the drawer's probable intent, at least one court
has proceeded one step farther. Having concluded that the drawer did
not intend the imposter as payee, that court proceeded to suggest that the
"imposter" rule had no application to the circumstances of the case before
it, leading to a denial of recovery as against the drawer.1 1 The statement,
however, would seem unnecessary and probably accomplishes little in
view of the fact that the same result would be reached by a determination
of the controlling issue of intent.
An argument often utilized to bolster certain of these decisions is that
the drawer, having been negligent in failing to require sufficient identifi-
cation of the imposter, is therefore estopped to deny validity of the
holder's title. The latter, having been entirely innocent throughout the
transaction, has been said to be under no duty to the drawer to determine
the genuineness of the imposter's signature.12  While one case rests solely
on this theory of negligence or estoppel,13 it would seem that the proper
theory to apply would be the "imposter" rule.
14
Can it be said, in retrospect, that the Negotiable Instruments Act
of Illinois is adequate to cope with the illustrated problem? The Appellate
Court, in the instant case, said that Section 43, which had been relied on
9 But see Bryant v. McGowan, 151 Pa. Super. 529, 30 A. (2d) 667 (1943), where
the court found the words added to the name used were merely descriptive, the
payee being described to be "Mrs. Catherine Nelson, as unremarried widow of Chas.
Nelson."
lO In Mercantile National Bank v. Silverman, 7 Hun. (N. Y.) 317, 132 N. Y. S.
1017 (1911), the payee was described as "Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Marsh."
The court found no intent to deal with the imposter, the drawer having had previous
acquaintance with a person of the name used.
11 Mercantile National Bank v. Silverman, 7 Hun. (N. Y.) 317, 132 N. Y. S. 1017
(1911).
12 McHenry v. Old Citizen's National Bank, 85 Ohio St. 203, 97 N. E. 395 (1911),
treated the drawer as estopped to deny validity of the imposter's endorsement. In
Hockett Co. v. Simmonds, 84 Ohio App. 467, 87 N. E. (2d) 739 (1949), however, the
negligence of the holder in due course in accepting the instrument after regular
banking hours was said to affect his right of recovery. The Minnesota case of
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Central Co-op. Ass'n, 201 Minn. 425, 276 N. W. 731(1937), also treated the negligence of the drawer as sufficient to preclude a denial
of the validity of the imposter's endorsement.
13 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Central Co-op. Ass'n, 201 Minn. 425, 276 N. W. 731
(1937).
14 Ryan v. Bank of Italy Nat. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 106 Cal. App. 690, 289 P. 863
(1930) ; Santa Maria v. Industrial City Bank, - Mass. -, 95 N. E. (2d) 176 (1950).
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by the defendant, 15 had no application to the circumstances presented."
Forgery being thereby ruled out as a defense, there would seem to be no
other section in the statute which could have direct application. As a
result, the court was forced to fall back on common law doctrines with all
the varying distinctions thereon which call for interpretation.' Fortu-
nately, the precise situation contained the important fact of physical
presence before the drawer, making it possible to apply the majority or
so-called "imposter" rule with ease. But what of the future when an in-
termediary agency is drawn into the picture? Will the Illinois court then
add to that class of cases which draw fine distinctions of fact? Now that
the court has seen fit to declare the "imposter" rule to be applicable,
would it not be advantageous for the legislature to aid this progressive
step by an appropriate amendment or addition to the statute? If the
purpose of the statute is one designed primarily to codify the law so as
to afford protection to the holder in due course, such an amendment or ad-
dition would, without question, serve that end.
R. 0. DRTINA
HUSBAND AND WIFE-ACTIONS -WHETHER, IN VIEW OF ENACTMENT
OF MARRIED WOMEN'S ACTS, A WIFE MAY MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR Loss
OF CONSORTIUm BASED ON NEGLIGENT INJURY CAUSED TO HER HUSBAND--
In the case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Company, Incorporated,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was presented, for
the first time since the passage of the Married Women's Act for that dis-
trict,2 with the situation of a wife attempting to recover an alleged loss of
consortium' brought about by defendant's negligence producing injury to
her husband. The husband, an employee of defendant, had been seriously
injured while at work. He applied for, and received, full compensation
for his injuries. Thereafter, the wife filed the instant action, relying on
the ground that the defendant's negligence had deprived her of her hus-
band's aid, assistance and sexual relations. The lower court dismissed
the action on defendant's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 98, § 43. The text thereof Is set forth in note 2,
ante.
16 341 Ill. App. 85 at 90, 93 N. E. (2d) 90 at 92.
17 Further discussion of the "imposter" rule may be found in 18 B. U. L. Rev. 148,
3 Col. L. Rev. 71, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 76, and 68 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 387. See also
Brannon, Negotiable Instrument Law Anno., 6th Ed., 349-58.
1183 F. (2d) 811 (1950), cert. den. 340 U. S. 852, 71 S. Ct. 80, 95 L. Ed. 39
(1950).
2 D. C. Code 1940, § 30-208.
3 Bouvier, Law Dict.. Rawle's 3d Rev., defines consortium as the "right of the
husband and wife respectively to the conjugal fellowship, company, co-operation
and aid of the other."
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appealed. The Court of Appeals, in an unprecedented decision which
examined into and rejected every major contrary decision bearing on the
subject, reversed the holding and said the complaint stated an actionable
case. To reach that decision, the court examined every reason advanced
to support the unanimous refusal pronounced in other jurisdictions to
permit a suit of this character and declared every reason so examined to be
unsound.
The first such theory followed elsewhere appears to be one predicated
on the premise that the material elements of consortium are the only
elements on which a recovery can be had. From this point, courts have
deduced two reasons for concluding that the wife cannot recover for loss
of consortium. The first of these reasons rests on the ground that, while
a husband is entitled to the services of his wife, the wife in turn has no
such right to her husband's services, without which right she is not en-
titled to recover.4  A typical case in which this reasoning was said to con-
trol is to be found in the Indiana case of Boden v. Del Mar Garage where
the court argued that there was "no authority in law which gives her a
right to recover for loss of consortium alone and it is expressly held in
this state that she cannot recover . . . And the cause of action which
the husband has against one who has negligently injured him is presumed
to fully compensate him for all losses sustained, and this includes the loss
of support for his wife and family.' '
The other line of cases, illustrating the second reason, based on a
materialistic conception of consortium, reject the wife's right to recover
on the ground that any interference with the husband's duty of support,
which may fairly be said to be the converse of the wife's duty to render
services, is fully compensated for in the action brought by the husband,
at least in so far as his ability to support his wife has been diminished as
a result of his injury. It follows therefrom that to allow the wife to
recover for loss of consortium in addition would result in a double re-
covery.'
4 Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N. E. 860 (1933) ; Brown v. Kistleman,
177 Ind. 692, 98 N. E. 631 (1912) ; Stout v. Kansas City Terminal By. Co., 172 Mo.
App. 113, 157 S. W. 1019 (1913).
5 205 Ind. 59 at 70, 185 N. E. 860 at 863. Some courts have held that the Married
Women's Acts have given the wife the right to the fruits of her own services and,
as a result, the husband is no longer entitled to her services. If this reasoning is
sound, the conclusion, reached by these courts, quite properly follows that the hus-
band may no longer maintain an action for the loss of that aspect of consortium:
Marri v. Stamford Street Ry. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 (1911) ; Harker v. Bushouse,
254 Mich. 187, 236 N. W. 222 (1931) ; Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821,
32 S. E. (2d) 611 (1945).
6 Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P. (2d) 1100 (1937);
Patelski v. Snyder, 179 Il1. App. 24 (1913) ; Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378.
263 N. W. 154 (1935); Gambino v. Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo. App.
653, 158 S. W. 77 (1913).
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Pointing to fallacies inherent in this major line of cases, the court
in the instant case made the following statement: "The difficulty with
adhering to these authorities is that they sound in the false premise that
in these actions the loss of services is the predominant factor. This dis-
tinction lacks precedent. It is nothing more than an arbitrary separation
of the various elements of consortium devised to circumvent the logic of
allowing the wife such an action. '"7 Continuing, the court also said:
"Consortium, although it embraces within its ambit of meaning the wife's
material services, also includes love, affection, companionship, sexual rela-
tions, etc., all welded into a conceptualistic unity. And, although loss of
one or the other of these elements may be greater in the case of any one
of the several types of invasions from which consortium may be injured
there can be no rational basis for holding that in negligent invasions
suability depends on whether there is a loss of services. It is not the fact
that one or the other of the elements of consortium is injured in a par-
ticular invasion that controls the type of action which may be brought
but rather that the consortium as such has been injured at all."" In this
manner, the court dismissed that line of reasoning.
Another series of cases, while giving recognition to the existence of
other and sentimental elements implicit in the word "consortium," have,
for one or more reasons, nonetheless, refused to allow the wife to recover.
These reasons proceed on a variety of grounds. It has been said that the
injury to the wife, not being direct, is not compensable; that such injuries,
being too remote, are incapable of ascertainment; that no recovery for loss
of consortium has ever been allowed without a showing of loss of services,
any injury to the sentimental elements acting only in aggravation of
damages; and that the Married Women's Act have given no new cause
of action to the wifeY The court in the present case, answering these
varied arguments, clearly establishes the inconsistency of this line of
thought by calling attention to the fact that courts which have looked with
favor on these theories have, nevertheless, allowed the husband to recover
183 F. (2d) 811 at 813.
s Ibid., p. 814.
9 For cases in this category, see Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N. E.
860 (1933); Feneff v. New York Central & Hartford Ry. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E.
436 (1909); Gambino v. Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co., 175 Mo. App. 653, 158
S. W. 77 (1913) ; Stout v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157
S. W. 1019 (1913) ; Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N. Y. S. 459 (1900) ; Smith
v. Nicholas Building Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N. E. 204, L. R. A. 1916E 700, An. Cas.
1918D 206 (1915) ; Howard v. Verdigris Valley Electric Co-operative, Inc., 201
Okla. 504, 207 P. (2d) 784 (1949) ; Kosciolek v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 81 Ore.
517, 160 P. 132 (1916).
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where the wife's injury has been due to the defendant's negligence. De-
cisions of the latter type would make it apparent that the validity of an
argument to the effect that the injury is too remote and indirect to allow a
recovery is made to turn on the sex of the injured party.10
In still other cases, courts have refused to protect the wife's interest
in such an action as this on the theory that the wife's interest in the
marital relation is not a property right, derived from bargain and sale,
but rather lies in an area into which the courts should not intrude, except
when necessity dictates that the wilful wrongdoer be punished, such as in
cases based on criminal conversation or alienation of affections. These
courts have theorized that the reason for allowing suits of that character
lies in the fact that the recovery is granted more as a form of punishment
than with thought of compensation to the injured party.1 Again, in
denying the efficacy of such reasoning, the instant court stated: "The civil
side of the court cannot permit an award of punitive damages except as
incidental to an actionable civil wrong."" The comment so made effec-
tively rebuts the argument that suits of the type here under consideration
can be, and are to be, maintained solely for the purpose of punishing the
wrongdoer.
The court deciding the instant case did not merely rely on inade-
quacies in the opposing arguments. Having shown the inconsistencies in
the aforementioned contrary theories, it turned to affirmative factors sup-
porting a recovery by the wife. In that regard, the court said that "logic,
reason and right are in favor of the position we are now taking. The
medieval concepts of the marriage relation to which other jurisdictions
have reverted in order to reach the results which have been handed to us
as evidence of the law have long since ceased to have any meaning. It
can hardly be said that a wife has less of an interest in the marriage rela-
tion than does the husband or in these modern times that a husband renders
services of such a different character to the family and household that they
must be measured by a standard of such uncertainty that the law cannot
10 Along much the same line, it might be noted that courts have allowed the bus-
band to recover, in suits based on criminal conversation, even though the husband
has condoned the conduct and no loss of services has occurred, the recovery being
based on sentimental elements alone. The fallacy of forbidding a similar suit to
the wife should be equally obvious. The injury to the sentimental areas of con-
sortium would be the same whether the injury arose from an intentional act, as is
required in actions for criminal conversation or alienation of affections, or from
negligent injury.
11 See Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N. E. 631 (1912) ; Goldman v. Cohen,
30 Misc. 336, 63 N. Y. S. 459 (1900).
12 183 F. (2d) 811 at 816. See also Johnson v. Luhman, 340 Il1. App. 625, 92 N. E.
(2d) 486 (1950).
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estimate any loss thereof . . . Under such circumstances it would be
judicial fiat for us to say that a wife may not have an action for loss of
consortium due to negligence."13
It was not without some judicial support for the view so expressed.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the case of Hipp v. E. I. Dupont
DeNemours Company,' had held that a wife possessed a right to recover
for a loss of consortium occasioned by a negligent injury to her husband,
only to reverse itself, however, a short time later. Dissenting justices in
two other jurisdictions have pointed up the inadequacies in the stand taken
by the majority view, 5 but the most recent support for the proposition
sustained herein is to be found in the case of McDade v. West."8 It is true
that the judges of the Georgia Appellate Court considering that case were
equally divided on the question of whether or not a wife should be allowed
such a recovery, 1 7 but three of the judges subscribed to the view that the
''wrong" is a direct wrong to the valuable interests of the wife, whether
intentional or not, the damage for which the husband cannot sue, and in
these days of enlightment, her rights should be recognized and enforced.""'
Far more important than the limited extent of acceptable authority is
the eminently sound reasoning which underlies the present decision. It
is axiomatic that the law, insofar as is possible, should give a remedy for
every violated right. It is also a well accepted proposition that, since the
adoption of the Married Women's Acts, both the husband and wife have
equal rights before the law, at least in all other areas.' 9 Keeping these
statements in mind, it is only necessary to recognize the conceptualistic
13 183 F. (2d) 811 at 819. This attitude has been reflected by others. See Vernier,
American Family Law (Stanford University Press, Stanford University, California,
1935), Vol. 3, § 158; Lippman, "The Breakdown of Consortium," 30 Col. L. Rev. 651
(1930); Holbrook, "The Change in the Meaning of Consortium," 22 Mich. L. Rev. 1
(1923); and note in 9 Ind. L. J. 182.
14182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318, 18 A. L. R. 873 (1921). The case was overruled by
the decision in Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 307, 37
A. L. R. 889 (1925).
15 See dissenting opinion of Bond, J., in Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208
S. W. 462 (1919), and that of Scudder, J., in Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div.
769, 270 N. Y. S. 534 (1934).
16 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S. E. (2d) 299 (1949).
17 The division necessitated affirmation of a trial court refusal to permit recovery.
18 80 Ga. App. 481 at 486, 56 S. E. (2d) 299 at 302.
19 This was, of course, not true under the common law because of the disabilities
which attached to the woman at the time of marriage. BI. Com., Book 3, § 143,
states: "We may observe that in these relative injuries, notice is only taken of the
wrong done to the superior of the parties related, by the breach and dissolution
of either the relation itself, or at least to the advantages accruing therefrom;
while the loss of the inferior by such injuries is totally unregarded. One reason
for which may be this: that the inferior hath no property in the company, care or
assistance of the superior, as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior;
and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury." Such reasoning is, of course,
no longer applicable in view of modern statutes on the subject.
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unity which is a part and parcel of the word "consortium" to appreciate
the validity of the court's findings in the instant case. Consortium, al-
though consisting of several distinct rights running in favor of the husband
and wife, is, in and of itself, a completely independent right. The proper
recognition of consortium as an independent right leads to a further recog-
nition that an injury to any one of the several component parts of the
right of consortium constitutes a proper ground upon which recovery may
be had. The refusal of the majority of the courts to recognize this basic
fact has been the greatest stumbling block, heretofore, in the path of allow-
ing a recovery in cases of this nature. It should, now, be removed.
There is, however, one danger that must be avoided. The danger of
allowing a double recovery is, without question, a strong possibility; but
it is one that can be avoided. The possibility of a double recovery may be
circumvented by appropriate instruction confiiiing the jury to a considera-
tion solely of those elements of consortium which are claimed injured by
the defendant's conduct. If, for example, the husband has already re-
covered adequate damages to compensate for the loss of his ability to
support his wife, jury consideration may be limited to the remaining in-
jured and uncompensated portions of the wife's right to consortium. True,
it may be difficult to measure, in monetary terms, the extent of the injury
suffered by the invasion of these other elements, but this should not con-
stitute ground for refusing to allow a recovery. If the damage is certain,
the fact that the extent of the damage is uncertain is not enough to bar a
recovery.20
The desirability of having courts in other jurisdictions follow the path
marked out by the present case is self-evident. It has been said that a
"rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts themselves, and
was supposed in the making to express the mores of the day, may be
abrogated by courts when the mores have so changed that perpetuation of
the rule would do violence to the social conscience. "21 So apt is this
statement to the present situation that, with the clear and forceful opinion
of the court in the instant case to guide them, it should be expected that
other courts will follow suit and abandon earlier views. Those views, seen
from the standpoint of modern enlightment, represent at best nothing more
than archaic custom.
A. L. WYMAN, JR.
20 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 51 S. Ct.
248, 75 L. Ed. 544 (1931).
21 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.,
1946), p. 136.
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MASTER AND SERVANT-SERVICES AND COMPENSATION-WHETHER OR
NOT AN EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENE-
FITS FOR THE PERIOD WHEN THE PLANT IS CLOSED FOR VACATION-The
final toot of the factory whistle, signalling the cessation of plant operations
for a vacation period, and the subsequent exodus of employees to their
local unemployment compensation offices, has produced a flurry of deci-
sions evaluating the right of such workers to share in the benefits provided
under various state unemployment compensation acts. Representative
of these cases are the two Michigan decisions in Renown Stove Company v.
Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission" and Hubbard v. Mich-
igan Unemployment Compensation Commission.
2
in the first of these cases, the employer laid off the employees for an
indefinite period. They immediately began drawing upon their unemploy-
ment benefits but, as the employer had designated the time between July
5 and July 18 as vacation time and had issued "pay" for this period, the
employer protested against the simultaneous issuance of benefits. After
administrative action had confirmed the employees' right to the benefits,
the employer appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan. That court,
after investigating the underlying sentiment which stimulated the enact-
ment of unemployment compensation legislation and finding that "the ob-
jective sought to be gained is protection against evils incident to invol-
untary unemployment and the fostering of social and economic security
by the payment of benefits to individuals who have suffered loss of pay
resulting from involuntary unemployment," 3 declared that certain of the
employees were incapacitated from receiving benefits for the stated period
but that others were entitled thereto. The court found that the legisla-
tive purpose had been codified in a provision of the Michigan statute which
disqualified an individual for benefit in any week with respect to which
he received payments in the form of "vacation with pay". 4  To discover
whether the checks disbursed by the employer constituted a "vacation with
pay," the court had recourse to the union contracts under which the em-
ployees were working and discovered that, under one contract, the period
"from July 5, 1948, to July 18, 1948" was expressly designated as a
vacation period.5  The contract covering the rest of the employees pro-
vided that the vacation was to be taken at a time to be mutually agreed
1328 Mich. 438, 44 N. W. (2d) 1 (1950).
2 328 Mich. 444, 44 N. W. (2d) 4 (1950).
3 328 Mich. 438 at 439, 44 N. W. (2d) 1 at 3.
4 Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, § 421.29(1) (d) (2).
5 Certain of the employees in the Renown Stove Company case were members of
the International Stove Mounters' Union. The contract with that union contained
the clause in question. Its members were the ones held disqualified as to benefits.
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upon but permitted the employees to receive from forty to eighty hours'
pay in lieu of a vacation."
Employees covered by the first contract were held incapacitated from
receiving unemployment benefits for they had received a "vacation with
pay" within the meaning of the statute. Those under the latter contract
were held to have an option to take a vacation, the exercise of which could
not be dictated by any arbitrary and unilateral action on the part of the
employer. As the checks tendered to these employees could not be con-
nected with the period in dispute, they were permitted to recover pro-
vided they met other eligibility tests laid down by the statute.
The problem and solution in the second case ran parallel to the first.
The company there, in the face of a refusal of the union to agree to a vaca-
tion plan, 7 closed the plant for a fixed period. The union contract pro-
vided for "compensation in lieu of a vacation" at the employee's option,
entitling him to payment whether or not he availed himself of a respite
from work. In the light of such a contract, the court held that the em-
ployees became involuntarily unemployed when the employer closed the
plant and were, therefore, eligible to receive unemployment compensation
benefits.8
The inherent purpose of the various unemployment compensation acts
is one designed to alleviate the physical and economic suffering likely to be
visited upon an individual who loses the security guaranteed by his
weekly pay check through involuntary unemployment.' It follows, there-
fore, that an applicant should not be entitled to unemployment benefits
where, although he has been forced to leave the work harness for a
period of time, he has received remuneration for that period. Where an
employee is forced, by an imposition of the employer's will, to take a
vacation but receives an amount of money from the latter, the character
of that payment will have much to do with whether or not compensation
is allowable. If the sum can be termed "wage" or "salary" or, whatever
its designation, is connected with the layoff period, additional compensa-
6These employees were members of the International Molders and Foundry
Workers Union.
7 Vacation periods had formerly been staggered throughout the year but the
employer, in the interest of increased plant efficiency, sought a simultaneous vaca-
tion period for all help. The union indicated a preference for a continuation of the
former plan.
8 The union contract conferred vacation benefits only on those who had worked
for a stated minimum period. As to the right of a new employee, one who had not
been employed for a sufficient time to receive a paid vacation, to seek unemployment
compensation benefits when temporarily forced out of work by a vacation shut-
down of the plant pursuant to the union contract calling for paid vacations, see
Claim of Rakowski, 276 App. Div. 625, 97 N. Y. S. (2d) 309 (1950).
9 American Central Mfg. Corp. v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Division, - Ind. - at -, 88 N. E. (2d) 256 at 258 (1949).
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tion should not be obtainable. 10 On the other hand, if the remuneration
has no nexus to the vacation period, the party should be entitled to
benefits provided other statutory requirements are satisfied. In order to
determine the nature or character of the payments, then, the employment
contract itself must be subjected to scrutiny.
Where the contract requires the granting of a vacation period but the
right of the employer to specify the period of such work holiday has
been retained by him, or where the employer and employees have designated
a specific non-work period, cases prior to the instant decisions have been
unanimous in denying to the employee the privilege of simultaneous
receipt of both unemployment benefits and vacation compensation."
Obviously, such a result is correct and proper. The issuance and delivery
of pay checks in such situations can have no other office than to provide
remuneration for the layoff period. As the employee receives a payment
from his employer which is definitely connected with the period of
unemployment, he has no right to additional compensation. The reasoning
of the Michigan court in the first cited case, at least as to those individuals
employed under the first contract mentioned, is so obviously right that
the decision, in this respect, provides little more than added weight to
the existing law.
The other contracts involved in the instant cases, however, did not
force the employees to take a respite from work. On the contrary, the
employment agreements allowed them the choice of working for the
full year with the right to receive "compensation in lieu of a vacation."
Under this situation, the Michigan court found that a forced layoff, even
though accompanied by the issuance of checks, did not deprive the em-
ployees of unemployment benefits for the work holiday. It was reasoned
that since the employer had contracted away his right to declare a vaca-
tion period, the payments received by his employees could have no
connection with the period of unemployment and had to be treated as
some form of bonus. Such being the case, there was a period of involuntary
10 The drafters of the various state acts have expressed the idea in different, yet
not contradictory, language. Some define the term "employment" expressly as in-
cluding periods of vacation with pay, or leave -with pay: Burn's Ind. Stat. Ann.
1933 (1951 Replace.), § 52-1532(a) (f). Others describe "total unemployment" as
that period with respect to which no wages are payable and during which no
services are performed. The word "wages," in turn, is defined to cover every form
of remuneration, including salaries, commissions, and bonuses: N. H. Rev. Laws
1942, Ch. 218, § 1, para. N (1) and P. In Illinois, the terms "unemployment" and
"wages" carry similar definitions: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 218(k) and
§ 218(g).
11 Kelly v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 136 Conn. 482, 72 A.(2d) 54 (1950) ; American Central Mfg. Corp. v. Review Board of Indiana Employ-
ment Security Division, - Ind. -, 88 N. E. (2d) 256 (1949) ; Wellman v. Riley,
Com'r of Labor, 95 N. H. 502, 67 A. (2d) 428 (1949) ; Hamlin v. Coolerator Co.,
227 Minn. 437, 35 N. W. (2d) 616 (1949).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
unemployment without the required contractual compensation, thereby
permitting access to payments under the state statute.
Even where the employee receives no check from the employer for
the vacation period, he may still be precluded from unemployment benefits.
The unemployment insurance acts generally prevent the payment, or in
some jurisdictions the immediate payment, of benefits where the unem-
ployment is produced by the employee's conduct in voluntarily leaving
work without good cause. 12  Clearly, where the closing of the plant is
brought about by the arbitrary action of the employer alone, this segment
of the law cannot negate the employee's right to benefits. Where, however,
a union contract exists which consents to the closing of the plant for
vacation purposes, statutory sections of the kind in question may become
operable. It has been held, for example, that if the individual, acting
through his union negotiators, voluntarily consents to a leave of absence,
he is not entitled to benefits notwithstanding the fact that under the
union contract he would not be entitled to any idle-time payment from the
employer."3 Reasoning of that character ought to be equally applicable
to those instances where the employee consents to the work stoppage for
the purpose of enjoying a vacation.
Notice should also be taken of another general requirement to be
found in unemployment insurance laws, one which requires that the
individual must be available for work in order to be eligible for benefits.14
One aspect of the decision in the Connecticut case of Kelly v. Adminis-
trator, Unemployment Compensation Act," a case involving a situation
wherein the employer closed the plant for a short holiday period and
tendered payment to the employees pursuant to the employment contract,
indicates that a denial of benefits would be proper upon the basis that
the workers were unavailable for work. That result was achieved on
the ground that, according to the court, no one could be found who
would hire the employees for the balance of the holiday period, con-
sidering the time it would take to process a registration of the idle
employees for work during that week. The court commented upon the
fact that it could "hardly be said that they were in the labor market
for so short a period. '16 Inasmuch as the Connecticut statute treats
an individual as not being unemployed if he receives a payment by way
12 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 223(a).
13 Moen v. Director of Division of Unemployment Security, 324 Mass. 246, 85 N. E.
(2d) 779, 8 A. L. R. (2d) 429 (1949) ; Mattey v. Unemployment Compensation Board
of Review, 164 Pa. Super. 36, 63 A. (2d) 429 (1949); In re Buffelen Lumber &
Mfg. Co., 32 Wash. (2d) 205, 201 P. (2d) 194 (1948).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 222(c).
15 136 Conn. 482, 72 A. (2d) 54 (1950).
16 136 Conn. 482 at 486, 72 A. (2d) 54 at 56.
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of compensation for loss of wages from his employer, 7 and as payment
clearly existed under the facts of that case, it would appear that the
rationale adopted was both unnecessary and unfortunate. The fact of
unemployment ought not be affected by the assumption that, at the end
of the "vacation" period, the employee might be recalled to work. For
that matter, it is not entirely impossible that another employer might
seek employees even for so short a period. Anyway, the statutory test
merely requires that the employee demonstrate that he is "available,"
that is that he will accept comparable work in the locality if it is offered
to him. It is doubtful, then, if the Connecticut court would fall back
on this rationale if the employer, without the employee's acquiescence,
were to cease operations for a "vacation" period without tendering pay,
yet promised to resume activity at the end of the period. Too much
reliance, therefore, should not be placed on that decision.
While the addition of the instant cases to the body of existing law
on the subject creates no conflict, and while both decisions appear sound,
it is clear that all of the problems relating to payment of unemployment
benefits for inactivity during vacation periods have not yet been solved.
A. KATZ
NEGLIGENCE - ACTS OR OMISSIONS CONSTITUTING NEGLIGENCE -
WHETHER OR NOT AN ARTIFICIALLY CREATED WATER-FILLED EXCAVATION
CONSTITUTES AN ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE-The Supreme Court of Indiana,
through the medium of the case of Plotzki v. Standard Oil Company of
Indiana,' had presented to it, for determination, a problem of not in-
frequent occurrence but which has often created a good deal of perplexity.
The case was one in which a parent sued to recover damages for the
wrongful death of the plaintiff's eleven-year old son. The defendant
had caused an excavation to be dug on certain realty owned by it within
municipal limits, which excavation was unguarded and located about
150 feet from a public street. The hole was visible to pedestrians and
was also frequented, to the knowledge of the defendant, by numerous
children while at play. The floor of the excavation was unevenly graded,
having drop-offs and hidden holes, some as much as eight feet in depth.
The pit became filled with rain water which, becoming murky in character,
concealed the hidden holes. The plaintiff's intestate waded in the pool
so formed and was drowned when he fell into one of the holes. The
plaintiff attempted to utilize the attractive nuisance doctrine as the
17 Conn. Gen. Stat. 1949, § 7508(4) (a).
1 - Ind. -, 92 N. E. (2d) 632 (1950). Emmert, Ch. J., and Gilkison, J.. each
wrote a dissenting opinion.
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basis for her suit, but defendant demurred on the ground the facts did
not state a cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer.
Upon direct appeal, a majority of the judges of the Supreme Court
affirmed the ruling, stating that a pool, pond, lake, stream or other body
of water does not, by the overwhelming weight of authority, constitute
an attractive nuisance. The majority also refused to agree that the
presence of sharp drop-offs and deep holes in artificially constructed
pools of water constituted traps or hidden dangers for which the defendant
could be held liable.
The "turntable" doctrine, one later to acquire the name of "attractive
nuisance," was originally formulated in this country in the case of
Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Company v. Stout,2 a case wherein an
infant was permitted to recover damages for injuries sustained notwith-
standing the fact that the infant was then trespassing. The court there
stated it to be a question for the jury to determine as to whether or not
the defendant's act in maintaining the instrumentality was likely to
attract children. If so, a duty was thereby imposed on the property
owner to prevent harm to infant trespassers; a duty not previously known
in law. The doctrine so formulated has been defined, in Pekin v. Mc-
Mahon,3 to be one creating an obligation to use reasonable care where
"land of a private owner is in a thickly populated or settled city adjacent
to a public street or alley and he has upon it, or suffers to be upon it,
dangerous machinery, or a dangerous pit or pond of water, or any other
dangerous agency, at a point thereon near such public street or alley,
of such a character as to be attractive to children of tender years, in-
capable of exercising ordinary care, and he is aware or has notice of its
attractions for children of that class."'
One would normally assume that bodies of water, even though
hazardous, would constitute such an allurement for children as to become
attractive nuisances. Courts, however, have historically held that natural
water hazards are not within the scope of the doctrine' although the reasons
advanced have not been consistent. From absence of liability for natural
water hazards, it has been an easy step to excuse the owner for the
consequences flowing from an artificial accumulation of water. Legally
speaking, the arguments may sound strange, but they bear evidence of
expediency. Some learned courts have displayed a remarkably business-
like viewpoint in holding that it would be impracticable to guard the
284 U. S. (17 Wall.) 657, 21 L. Ed. 745 (1874).
3 154 Ill. 141, 39 N. E. 484, 27 L. R. A. 206, 45 Am. St. Rep. 114 (1895).
4 154 Ill. 141 at 148, 39 N. E. 484 at 485.
5 Peers v. Pierre, 336 Ill. App. 134, 83 N. E. (2d) 20 (1949) ; Wood v. Consumers
Co., 334 Ill. App. 530, 79 N. E. (2d) 826 (1949). See additional citations in 8
A. L. R. (2d) 1262.
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water hazard." In Sullivan v. Huidekoper,7 for example, the court used
colorful language to the effect that every "man who has been brought
up with the freedom allowed to American boys knows that you might
as well try to dam the Nile with bulrushes as to keep boys away from
ponds, pools or other bodies of water."" For want of better reason to deny
liability, some courts have been induced to disregard the value of life
and have advanced a morbid consideration based on a mathematic pro-
portion between the small number of deaths in relation to the large
number of boys who visit ponds or bodies of water.' Others, acting as
amateur psychologists, have indicated that it is the nature of boys to
seek out bodies of water so that the expense of securing the same from
invasion would be astronomical in comparison to the utility derived from
such water.'
It has been an accepted fact, in a few jurisdictions, that water may
be considered to be patently dangerous, but these courts have refused to
transfer the burden of the duty of protecting the infant from the parent
to the property owner on whose land the water is situated. These courts
presuppose that it is the duty of the parent to acquaint the child with
the patent danger of water and of the possibility of drowning therein.1
Such a duty is regarded as preventative on the part of the parent rather
than a curative one resting on the property owner. As candidly stated in
the Minnesota case of Stendal v. Boyd,' 2 if an owner "must guard an
artificial pond on his premises, so as to prevent injury to children who may
be attracted to it, he must, on the same principle, guard a natural pond;
and, if the latter, why not a brook or creek, for all water is equally alluring
to children 3
Being aware of the danger which would be created by fixing unlim-
ited liability on the land owner, courts have nevertheless devised a method
6Melandez v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal. (2d) 741, 68 P. (2d) 971 (1937);
Sullivan v. Huidekoper, 27 App. Cas. 154, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 263 (D. C., 1906);
Emond v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N. W. 760 (1914).
727 App. Cas. 154, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 263 (1906).
8 27 App. Cas. 154 at 163-4.
9 Barnhart v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 89 Wash. 304, 154 P. 441, L. R. A.
1916D 443 (1916); Holland v. Lanarkshire Middle Ward Dist. Council, [1909]
Sc. L. Rep. 1142.
10 Cobb v. Lowe Mfg. Co., 227 Ala. 456, 150 So. 687 (1933) ; Emond v. Kimberly-
Clark Co., 159 Wis. 83, 149 N. W. 760 (1914).
11 Luallen v. Woodstock Iron & Steel Corp., 236 Ala. 621, 184 So. 182 (1938);
Peters v. Bowman, 15 Cal. 345, 47 P. 113, 56 Am. St. Rep. 106 (1896) ; King v.
Simon Bruck Co., 42 Cal. App. (2d) 586, 126 P. (2d) 628 (1942) ; McCall v. McCal-
lie, 48 Ga. App. 99, 171 S. E. 843 (1933) ; McKenna v. City of Shreveport, 16 La.
App. 234, 133 So. 524 (1931).
1273 Minn. 53, 75 N. W. 735, 42 L. R. A. 288, 72 Am. St. Rep. 597 (1898). The
complaint had been sustained in 67 Minn. 279, 69 N. W. 899 (1897).
13 73 Minn. 53 at 55, 75 N. W. 735.
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of allowing for some degree of liability where water is artificially gathered
on the land, yet limiting the scope of that liability. The vehicle by which
this has been accomplished has been through the introduction of an element
of unusual danger existing about the water hazard. Such unusual danger
has been considered to be an additional allurement, turning the presence
of water into an attractive nuisance. In the Illinois case of Peers v.
Pierre,14 a case similar on its facts to the instant one, the court denied re-
covery by saying that the "weight of authority is to the effect that the
attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply to ponds where there is no
unusiul danger.'1 5 But it did refer to Pekin v. McMahon,16 one of the
leading cases in which liability has been established because of the pres-
ence of an unusual danger. The danger there took the form of a raft-like
log floating on the pond. The extra hazard necessary has been satisfied
by a floating sidewalk ;17 by floating sawdust in the pool ;"' by a spoil bank
with sand adjacent to the pool;19 and by a plank walk with access to a
pumphouse.Y°
Absent such an unusual danger, recovery has generally been denied
in the so-called "excavation" cases. In the Texas case of Banker v. Me-
Laughlin,21 however, an infant was drowned in an excavation filled with
water. The excavation was located in a homesite, in close proximity to
dwellings wherein lived numerous families with children. No unusual
danger was evident beyond the presence of accumulated water, but the
court was persuaded to allow a recovery, utilizing the attractive nuisance
doctrine as the basis therefor. It stressed three points to justify the re-
sult. In the first place, the body of water served no practical purpose and
possessed no value or utility. Second, the water hazard could have been
abated or removed at a nominal cost. The third point turned on the
landowner 's knowledge of the presence of children on the premises. The
accumulation of these three was said to be enough to impose liability.
That decision marked a departure from prior Texas holdings, but the views
so expressed have found favor in only a few other jurisdictions."
The Indiana court, in the instant case, may be said to have resolved
14 336 Ill. App. 134, 83 N. E. (2d) 20 (1948).
15 336 Ill. App. 134 at 138, 83 N. E. (2d) 20 at 22. Italics added.
16 154 Ill. 141, 39 N. E. 484, 27 L. R. A. 206, 45 Am. St. Rep. 114 (1895).
17 Linnberg v. City of Rock Island, 136 fI1. App. 495 (1907). The same case, on
subsequent appeal, appears in 157 Ill. App. 527 (1910).
18 Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 215 F. 8, L. R. A. 1915A 731 (1914).
19 Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U. S. 411, 54 S. Ct. 487, 78 L. Ed. 882 (1934).
2
o Howard v. City of Rockford, 270 Ill. App. 155 (1933).
21146 Tex. 434, 208 S. W. (2d) 843, 8 A. L. R. (2d) 1231 (1948).
2 2 Peters v. City of Tampa, 115 Fla. 666, 155 So. 854 (1934) ; Altus v. Mullihan,
98 Okla. 12, 23 P. 851 (1924) ; Pigford v. Cherokee Falls Mfg. Co., 124 S. C. 389,
117 S. E. 419 (1923).
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the problem correctly, if correctness is to be measured by the weight of
authority. The fact remains, however, that it is undeniable that certain
bodies of water are hazardous to children who may be attracted by them.
It may be better, for that reason, to have these cases decided on their in-
dividual facts rather than by attempting to fit them into arbitrary cate-
gories. Certainly, the Indiana court has not contributed to that end, while
the Texas court, although not deciding correctly in view of the weight of
authority, has shown an adventurous spirit which might well stimulate
thought.
If practicability is to be the keynote, in working out a definition of
a water hazard as an attractive nuisance, would it not be more practicable
to permit the jury, rather than a court on demurrer, to evaluate the sev-
eral factors? It might be remembered that to be practical is not always
to be wise. But, for that matter, to be legal is not always to be just. A
happy medium, however, may lie at the point where legal and practical
approaches unite in the just and equitable disposition of cases.
E. F. NOWAK
WILLS--CONSTRUCTION-WVHETHER OR NOT A LEGATEE GRANTED AN
ANNUITY BY WILL MAY ELECT TO TAKE THE CAPITAL SUM IN LIEU THER_-
or-The problem before the court in the recent Illinois case of In re Her-
rick's Estate1 turned about the question as to whether or not a legatee
could elect to take the capital sum in lieu of an annuity which had been
provided for her under the will of the testatrix. ' It appeared that the
testatrix had received literature from the American Bible Society explain-
ing a plan by which persons desiring to help the society, and to further
its missionary work, might do so by purchasing annuity contracts from it.
Under these contracts, the named annuitant would receive a stipulated
certain amount for life with reversion of the principal, at the annuitant 's
death, going to the society. Testatrix had, during her lifetime, purchased
several such annuities with the avowed intention of helping the society
in its work. By her will, she directed her executor to purchase another
annuity from the same society for the benefit of her cousin. The executor,
after the death of the testatrix, which was soon followed by the death of
the annuitant-legatee, petitioned the probate court for directions con-
cerning the purchase of the annuity. Objection was made by the executor
of the estate of the cousin. He claimed the principal sum in lieu of the
annuity. On appeal from an order overruling the objection and direct-
ing the executor to pay the fund to the society, the circuit court reversed
1 Sub nom. American Bible Society v. Chase, 340 Ill. App. 548, 92 N. E. (2d) 332
(19.50).
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the judgment. The Appellate Court for the Second District, passing on
the question for the first time in this state, in turn reversed the circuit
court and remanded the case to the probate court with direction to pro-
ceed as originally ordered.
Cases dealing with testamentary direction to purchase or provide an
annuity generally fall into one of three classes. Under the first, the will
contains an absolute direction to make the purchase. The second group
includes cases where the will contains a gift over of the residue, after
payment of the annuity, to a designated remainderman. The third treats
with a direction to purchase an annuity from a named corporation for
the benefit of a designated annuitant for life with the understanding that
any unexpended portion of the principal is to remain in the hands of the
corporation.
As to the first class, an uninterrupted line of English cases has held
that a bequest of money to be used in the purchase of an annuity gives to
the legatee an unqualified right to elect to take the money itself, so as
to put the annuitant in a position where he can insist that the annuity
shall not be bought.2  There is consistency in this reasoning 3 for it is
based on the accepted premise that, as the legatee may sell the particular
object as soon as it has been bought for him, the law should not require
the doing of a nugatory act.4 The first American case, that of Reid v.
Brown,5 adopted much the same view. The action was one to construe a
will directing the purchase of an annuity for the benefit of a named per-
son but with a direction to give the money to certain designated charitable
organizations in the event the beneficiary had predeceased the testator.
The annuitant, who had survived, elected to take the principal as a lump
sum in preference to the annuity which might have been purchased there-
with. The court, holding that she had that right, stated that: "Where an
absolute and unqualified annuity is given, with instructions to invest a
sum sufficient to purchase the annuity, the annuitant may elect to take the
capital sum instead of having it invested for the purpose of producing
the annuity. "6
The fundamental principle which underlies this view, one which treats
2 Ford v. Batley, 17 Beav. 303, 51 Eng. Rep. 1050 (1853); Kerr v. Middlesex
Hospital, 2 DeG., M. & G. 576, 42 Eng. Rep. 996 (1852) ; Stokes v. Heron, 12 Cl. &
Fin. 161, 8 Eng. Rep. 1361 (1845); Dawson v. Hearn, 1 Russ. & M. 606, 39 Eng.
Rep. 232 (1831) ; Bayley v. Bishop, 9 Ves. jun. 6, 32 Eng. Rep. 501 (1803) ; Barnes
v. Rowley, 3 Ves. jun. 305, 30 Eng. Rep. 1024 (1797) ; Yates v. Compton, 2 P. Wms.
308, 24 Eng. Rep. 743 (1725). See also Jarman, Wills, 7th Ed., Vol. 2, p. 1109.
3 Scott, Trusts, Vol. 3, § 346, p. 1898. See also note in 41 Mich. L. Rev. 276.
4 2 Am. Jur., Annuities, § 33.
554 Misc. 481, 106 N. Y. S. 27 (1907).
6 54 Misc. 481 at 482, 106 N. Y. S. 27 at 27. See also Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law,
2d Ed., Vol. 2, p. 399.
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the annuity provision as no more than one providing for a transferable
legacy, has been repeatedly followed in Massachusetts and New York.'
In fact, the insistent refusal to follow the evident intention of the testator
probably reached its peak in one New York case, that of In re Cole's
Estate," for the court there, in substance, stated the intention of the
testator did not count as he should have known the law on the subject
when he drew up his will. That attitude probably led to the passage of a
statute in New York, one which forbids any right of election if there is a
direction to purchase an annuity from an insurance company unless the
will gives express recognition to such a right.9 Despite this statute, a New
York court, applying a strict construction thereto, has still permitted a
right of election where the direction is one to purchase the annuity from
some one other than an insurance company.10
In contrast, a larger number of American jurisdictions have refused
to adopt the English view than have accepted it.1" In the Ohio case of
Feiler v. Klein,12 for example, the court was faced with a similar problem
arising under a direction in a will for the purchase of an annuity for the
life of the beneficiary. It decided that the annuitant had no right to
elect to take the principal in lieu thereof because it was said that the in-
tention of the testator should control. When the will was construed as the
court supposed the testator understood it, it revealed a purpose to lay
out a fixed and certain amount in the purchase of the annuity but con-
templated that the benefit thereof should accrue to the annuitant for life
and not in one lump sum. In answer to the claim that the making of the
purchase would be rendered nugatory by the annuitant 's sale of the
annuity contract, the court pointed out that the annuitant would find a
7 Parker v. Cobe, 208 Mass. 260, 94 N. E. 476 (1911); In re Cole's Estate, 219
N. Y. 435, 114 N. E. 785 (1916) ; In re Fisher's Estate, 261 App. Div. 252, 25 N. Y. S.(2d) 140 (1941); In re Proctor's Will, 235 App. Div. 6, 255 N. Y. S. 722 (1932) ;
In re Fuller's Ex'rs, 227 App. Div. 801, 237 N. Y. S. 207 (1929) ; In re Bartuch's
Will, 225 App. Div. 773, 232 N. Y. S. 36 (1928) ; In re Foster's Estate, 174 Misc.
933, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 252 (1940); In re Oakley's Will, 142 Misc. 1, 254 N. Y. S.
306 (1931). See also In re Maybaum's Estate, 296 N. Y. 201, 71 N. E. (2d) 865
(1947).
8 219 N. Y. 435, 114 N. E. 785 (1916).
9 Thompson, Consol. Laws N. Y. 1939, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, § 47-b, Decedent Estate Law,
states: "If a person hereafter dying shall direct in his will the purchase from an
insurance company of an annuity, the person or persons to whom the income
thereof shall be directed to be paid shall not have the right to elect to take the
capital sum directed to be used for such purpose in lieu of such annuity except
to the extent the will expressly provides for such right . . ."
10 See In re Fisher, 261 App. Div. 252, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 140 (1941).
11 The problem appears to have arisen in only five states in addition to Massa-
chusetts and New York. The opposite view is illustrated by In re Lawrence's
Estate, 17 Cal. (2d) 1, 108 P. (2d) 893 (1941) ; Ketcham v. International Trust
Co., 117 Colo. 559, 192 P. (2d) 426 (1948) ; In re Johnson's Estate, 238 Iowa 1221,
30 N. W. (2d) 164 (1947) ; Bedell v. Colby, 94 N. H. 384, 54 A. (2d) 161 (1947);
Feiler v. Klein, 149 Ohio St. 237, 74 N. E. (2d) 384 (1947).
12 149 Ohio St. 237, 74 N. E. (2d) 384 (1947).
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sale difficult as the face value of the contract would be uncertain. Ex-
cept as an agreement might be worked out between the annuitant and the
holder of the fund for a commutation thereof into, and payment of, its
present worth, the majority reasoning is persuasive and reflects the sounder
attitude that the intention of the testator should control.
The second class of cases deals with directions calling for the purchase
of an annuity for life with a gift over of the residue to a designated remain-
derman. Again, the English decisions would seem to favor the right of the
annuitant to elect to take the capital sum in lieu of the annuity, even to
the disappointment of the remainderman's expectations," but the Ameri-
can courts would appear to be in complete harmony on a rule to the effect
that where there is a gift over the annuitant has no right of election.14
Whatever the quality of the reasoning behind the English view, it would
seem more nearly to be the intention of the testator, from the presence of
the gift over, that the annuitant should have no more than a life interest.
If the remainderman has a vested interest in the principal sum, or in the
residue thereof, the annuitant certainly should not be allowed to destroy
that interest.
Between these two views lies the third group, one into which the in-
stant case falls. Herein are found the cases dealing with the purchase
of annuities from a named company for the purpose of paying stipulated
sums to the beneficiary for life but with the remainder, if any, staying
in the hands of the company selling the contract. The first American
case in this category also arose in New York. In the case of In re Geis,'5
the testator, who had been active in missionary work, made a will direct-
ing the purchase of annuities from certain missionary societies for the
benefit of named legatees. These legatees claimed a right to elect to take
the principal in lieu of the annuity provision but the court refused to
permit any such election. The court considered it to be the intention of
the testator that the beneficiaries were to receive what was, in essence, a life
estate with a remainder over to the societies to receive the unexpended por-
tions of the principal at the death of the annuitants, even though such
purpose was not expressly stated. The purpose being, in reality, to make
a gift to the societies of the residue after payment of the annuities, the
annuitants were denied the right to destroy this vested interest in the
principal. That holding has been followed in later cases arising in Ohio' 6
and Maryland, 17 and is now accepted into the law of Illinois.
13 See Timins v. Stockhouse, 27 Beav. 434, 54 Eng. Rep. 170 (1858).
14 In re Oakley's Will, 142 Misc. 1, 254 N. Y. S. 306 (1931) ; In re Lejie's Estate,
181 Pa. 416, 37 A. 554 (1897).
15 167 Misc. 357, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 770 (1938).
16 Feller v. Klein, 149 Ohio St. 237, 74 N. E. (2d) 384 (1947).
17 The Maryland Court of Appeals, in Gilbert v. Finlay College, - Md. -, 74 A.
(2d) 36 (1950), reached a similar conclusion on somewhat similar facts to the
ones in the instant case.
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When the particular plan of disposition utilized by the testator in the
instant case is borne in mind, the results achieved are nothing if not
eminently fitting. A testator, intent on providing a modicum of support
for the natural objects of his bounty, but nothing more, ought to be assured
that the unneeded portions of his estate will eventually inure to his fa-
vored charity without the necessity of interposing a trust to support the
ultimate distribution. The instant holding provides that assurance.
B. BERGER
